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In his article entitled “On Ontological Foundations of Conceptual Modeling”
(henceforth OFCM), Boris Wyssusek reviews several approaches that have the
common objective of investigating how results from areas such as formal
ontology in philosophy, cognitive science, semiotics and linguistics can be
employed in the construction of a well-founded theoretical basis for the disci-
pline of conceptual modeling in computer science. Despite the title of his
essay, which may let the reader think of an analysis of what the ontological
foundations of conceptual modeling are, Wyssusek wonders whether the very
idea makes sense, concluding very negatively that “the project of ontology-
based conceptual modeling appears to be impossible in principle”. We shall
bring here arguments against such conclusion, hoping to convince the readers
that the ontology-driven approach to conceptual modeling is well and alive,
and that it dramatically improves the quality of information systems.
Although it mentions very briefly other approaches, Wyssusek’s article is
very much focused on the so-called BWW approach, an adaptation made by
Ron Weber and Yair Wand of the original theory proposed by the Argentinean
theoretical physicist and philosopher of science Mario Bunge. In that respect,
due to the popularity of BWW, a contribution of OFCM is to make explicit the
SJIS 18(1).book  Page 115  Friday, October 6, 2006  9:24 AM
1
Guarino and Guizzardi: In the Defense of Ontological Foundations for Conceptual Modeling
Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 2006
116 • N. Guarino & G. Guizzardi
way that approach was formulated, and its differences with respect to Bunge’s
original work.
Three important characteristics of the “B” and the “WW” parts of the the-
ory have been recognized in Wyssusek’s analysis: 
1. Bunge’s ontology commits to a materialist and, thus, reductionist
worldview;
2. Wand and Weber did not actually select BUNGE’s theory in the strong
sense of the term because they did not systematically compare it with
other alternatives. In particular, statements such as “I have used
Bunge’s theory because it articulates constructs and relationships that
appear [our emphasis] useful in the information systems and computer
science disciplines” cannot be satisfied a priori. Furthermore,
statements such as “in my view it is the best formulated and most
complete theory of ontology that I have been able to find” do not have
any scientific content since, at minimum, the author should make
transparent under which criteria the ontology can be considered the
most complete and best formulated, and which are the ontologies that
he was able to find;
3. Once Bunge’s theory had been “selected”, the further choice of
ontological categories that gave rise to BWW was made in an ad hoc
way, i.e., Wand and Weber chose some of these categories on the basis
of their own experience and on what appeared to be useful for
information and computer scientists. Moreover, without making the
necessary ontological commitment to Bunge’s theory, they were able
to adapt the semantics of the selected categories to fit their needs. A
convenient move, although—as Wyssusek observes—one that
weakens any claim of well-foundness of the resulting ontology.
Making these facts explicit is without doubt an important contribution of Wys-
susek’s article, since it facilitates the debate on different approaches for devel-
oping ontological foundations for conceptual modeling. However, despite the
criticisms, the author seems to fall in the same trap of Wand and Weber,
namely, he also approaches ontology as if Bunge’s ontology was the only
available scientific ontology. As if denying materialism one would also neces-
sarily deny a scientific approach to ontology. A posture which is also mani-
fested in the article’s bibliography: there are no references to philosophical
theories in ontology outside Bunge’s work.
The author comments on the following statement by Wand and Weber
(Weber 1997a, p. 73): “Like the ontological researchers in philosophy, they,
too, were concerned with how humans structure their conceptions of the
world”. His comment is: “The latter claim is obviously at variance with (not
SJIS 18(1).book  Page 116  Friday, October 6, 2006  9:24 AM
2
Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 18 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://aisel.aisnet.org/sjis/vol18/iss1/1
N. Guarino & G. Guizzardi • 117
only) Bunge’s understanding of ontology, since ontology is not ‘concerned
with how humans structure their conceptions of the world’. Rather, ontology is
concerned with ‘concrete objects’ (Bunge 1977, p. 6). […] ‘The investigation
of the patterns of representation […] belongs to psychology, epistemology and
methodology (Bunge 1974b, p. 104)’—but, for obvious reasons, not to ontol-
ogy” (Wyssusek 2006, p. 73).
This passage summarizes the core of the argument defended in OFCM. In
short, Wyssusek generalizes Wand and Weber’s view of conceptual modeling
as well as Bunge’s view of ontology, and concludes that there is no relation
between the two. In particular, he makes the claims that (1) conceptual mode-
ling is about how humans structure their knowledge, and (2) ontology is about
“concrete objects”, and then concludes that there can be no ontological foun-
dations for conceptual modeling.
To negate this conclusion, our line of reasoning will be the following: (1)
the way humans structure their knowledge cannot elude ontological issues; (2)
ontology is not just about concrete objects; in particular, so-called formal
ontology is completely neutral for what concerns its domain of application.
Note that point (1) alone is sufficient to conclude that ontology is very rele-
vant for conceptual modeling. Point (2) is just an extra clarification.
Let us start our discussion considering the first claim. In a seminal paper on
conceptual modeling, its history and evolution, Mylopoulos (1992) defines
conceptual modeling as “the activity of formally describing the physical and
social world around us for the purpose of understanding and communication”.
Thus, since conceptual models are descriptions to be used by humans for
understanding and communicating about reality, both the choices concerning
the representation language adopted and the specific representation structures
encoded in such language ought to play a role. However, frequently the choice
between alternative representation structures can only be justified on ontologi-
cal grounds. To show this, let us advance the following example.
Suppose we want to state that a red apple exists. In predicate calculus we
would write down a logical formula such as
(1)
Although logic provides a rigorous way to assign this formula a precise
semantics, its actual real-world interpretation is of course completely arbi-
trary. In particular, the predicates apple and red are put here in the same logi-
cal footing, regardless of the nature (i.e., the ontological status) of the entity
types they represent and their different importance for conveying relevant
information about a certain individual. First-order logic is indeed completely
“flat” in this respect.
x apple x( ) red x( )∧( )∃
SJIS 18(1).book  Page 117  Friday, October 6, 2006  9:24 AM
3
Guarino and Guizzardi: In the Defense of Ontological Foundations for Conceptual Modeling
Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 2006
118 • N. Guarino & G. Guizzardi
In order to overcome the “flatness” of logical languages, structured repre-
sentation languages are adopted. To compare them to purely logical formal-
isms, Brachman (1979) has introduced the notion of a (so-called)
epistemological level on top of the logical level. Part of the rationale behind
this view is that representation formalisms should be designed to capture inter-
relations between pieces of knowledge that cannot be smoothly captured by
purely logical languages. 
Indeed, languages such as UML and EER offer powerful structuring con-
structs such as classes, relationships (attributes) and sub-classing relations.
This means that, if we want to express formula in a language such as UML we
would have to face the following structuring choices: either (a) consider that
there are instances of Apple that posses the property of being red or, (b) con-
sider that there are instances of Red things that have the property of being an




Both these many-sorted formulas are equivalent to (1). However, they express
very different knowledge structuring choices. 
As discussed in (Guarino 1994), structuring decisions, such as this one, are
not so much the result from heuristic considerations, but they rather reflect
important ontological distinctions that should be motivated and explained. For
instance, in this case, the choice (a) can reflect the assumption that the prop-
erty of being an apple can be classified as a Natural Kind whereas Red as an
Attribution (Guarino and Welty 2000; Guizzardi, Wagner, Guarino, and van
Sinderen 2004). Whilst the former property necessarily holds for all its
instances (an apple cannot cease to be an apple without ceasing to exist—we
say the property is rigid), the latter only holds contingently (it is not rigid).
Moreover, whilst the former supplies a principle of identity for its instances,
i.e., a principle through which we judge whether two apples are numerically
the same, the latter does not supply one (since knowing that x and y are both
red gives no clue to decide whether or not x=y).
On the other hand, a formula like (3) sounds intuitively odd: what are we
quantifying over? Do we assume the existence of ìinstances of rednessî that
can have the property of being apples? The answer coming from philosophical
ontology (Quine’s (1969) dictum “no entity without identity”) is that we
should only quantify on things which do have a principle of identity. Insofar as
being red does not supply such a principle, the structuring choice expressed by
(3) cannot be justified. It may be important to note that, besides being well
x∃ :Apple.red x( )
x∃ :Red.apple x( )
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recognized in philosophy and in linguistics (van Leeuwen 1991; Gupta 1980),
the role of identity principles is explicitly defended in conceptual modeling
(e.g., Chen’s (1976) design rationale for ER). 
In summary, in many modeling cases, the motivation and explanation for
choosing between structuring alternatives which are logically equivalent lies
in ontological criteria. In particular, the example above illustrates a recurrent
pattern in which a structuring choice results as non-justifiable only after the
different ontological nature of the logical properties involved is taken into due
account. In this case, the distinction is between rigid and non-rigid properties.
It is noteworthy that these distinctions between properties, and the cognitive
relevance of those properties that supply principles of identity are supported
by a significant number of independent scientific experiments (Guizzardi
2005).
Contra Wyssusek, we claim that conceptual modelers are sometimes
indeed working with ontological questions. Examples include: Is there one
unique identity criterion for all objects? Is this type subsumed by multiple
supertypes? Is there such a thing as a property of properties? Is this parthood
relation transitive? Even one of the questions easily dismissed by the author,
namely, “Is a community anything but the set of its members?” is a genuine
ontological question (extensional identity criteria for intentional collectives)
often recurring while modeling enterprises. Indeed, in our experience, there
are dozens of recurrent conceptual modeling problems whose solution relies
on answering ontological questions. In the sequel, we shall briefly mention
just three of them.
(a) Role modeling with multiple admissible types: Suppose that a company
has two kinds of customers: individual persons and organizations. Van Belle
(1999) put the problem as follows: “How would one model the customer
entity conceptually? The Customer as a supertype of Organisation and Person?
The Customer as a subtype of Organisation and Person? The Customer as a
relationship between or Organisation and (Organization or Person)?”. This
problem led STEIMANN (2000) for example, to propose a complete separation
of role and type hierarchies in conceptual models – a solution that implies a
radical transformation to the meta-models of most of the current conceptual
modeling languages.
The ontological approach adopted in (Guizzardi et al. 2004) not only
allowed to propose a more parsimonious solution to this problem, but also a
general one that is captured in a general modeling pattern. The adequacy of
this modeling pattern is also demonstrated by examples in that article. It is
important to emphasize that the solution proposed could only be developed by
analyzing the identity and behavior of different kinds of properties, repre-
sented by classifiers in conceptual modeling languages. The theory of univer-
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sals, individuation and identity employed in that article, further refined in
(Guizzardi 2005), is a genuine ontological theory.
(b) Harmonization of different notions of roles and the counting problem:
Another topic discussed in (Steimann 2000) is the multitude of senses in
which the notion of role is used in the conceptual modeling literature. Two of
these senses have been deemed as largely incompatible, namely, (i) roles as a
sort of anti-rigid universals exemplified by instances of certain admissible
types, and (ii) roles as a sort of rigid universals exemplified by ad-hoc entities
(so-called qua-entities). Examples of conceptual modeling approaches that
assume the former sense abound (e.g., Guarino and Welty 2000; Steimann
2000). The latter sense has been proposed initially in (Wieringa, de Jonge, and
Spruit 1995) to address a problem known as The Counting Problem, which has
a serious impact on the everyday practice of conceptual modeling. In (Guiz-
zardi 2005), by using a well-founded ontological theory based on philosophi-
cal literature we have been able to: (i) provide ontological interpretations for
the two senses of roles aforementioned; (ii) harmonize these two notions by
showing that they are not competing conceptions of the same entity type but
that they are conceptions of complementary entity types; (iii) propose a solu-
tion to the Counting Problem. 
(c) Nature of parthood relations: Parthood relations are important mode-
ling concepts from several perspectives: (i) cognitive – for the realization of
many important cognitive tasks (Tversky 1989); (ii) ontological – serving as a
foundation for the formalization of other entities that compose a foundational
ontology [16]; (iii) software design—some modal properties of part-whole
relations will impose constraints on the life cycles of objects implementing
these relations. Although the notion of parthood is represented in practically
all conceptual modeling languages (e.g., OML, UML, EER, LINGO), it is
often understood only superficially in these languages, incorporating merely
the very minimal axiomatization that the notion requires. Properties of part-
whole relations have been a much discussed theme in ontological research
since Husserl’s third Logical Investigation and Lesniewski’s first Mereologi-
cal System in 1916 (Simons 1987; Varzi 1996). Ontological questions
answered by such theories include: What are the minimum meta-properties of
parthood relations? Are parthood relations always transitive? Is there one
unique kind of parthood relation irrespective of the kinds of the involved
relata? What kind of relation holds the parts of a whole together? Are there
objects that only exist being part of a specific whole (or of a whole of certain
kind)? Are there objects that only exist having a specific object as part (or a
part of a specific kind)? 
To answer these questions, we need to combine ontological analysis with
cognitive and linguistic considerations. In (Artale, Franconi, Guarino, and
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Pazzi 1996), an extensive ontology-based analysis of modeling problems con-
cerning parthood relations has been given; in (Guizzardi 2005) and (Vieu and
Aurnague 2005), a solution to the difficult and recurrently discussed problem
of transitivity of (functional) parthood relations has been offered, based on an
ontological analysis of the notion of function and functional dependence.
In conclusion, we believe that the examples above bring enough evidence
of the role played by ontological analysis in conceptual modeling.
Let us now go back to the second claim made by Wyssusek, i.e., that ontol-
ogy is about “concrete objects”. Indeed, reducing the inventory of reality to
contain only this sort of entities results from a specific ontological choice
made by Bunge, implicitly adopted by Wyssusek. However, many ontological
theories countenance the existence of abstract entities. For instance, most the-
ories that commit to the existence of repeatable universals accept the existence
of universals as abstract patterns of features. Other examples of abstract enti-
ties typically considered as constituents of ontologies are numbers, sets,
classes, forms, and regions. In fact, although, typically, a “concrete object” is
defined as an object extended in time and space, Bunge seems to define con-
crete objects (or things) to be the set of things which are part of the world.
Now, BUNGE’s universals, albeit immanent, are not part of the world. As a
consequence, according to this definition, his concept of law (a cornerstone of
his theory) is not a concrete thing. Ergo, even for Bunge, in a strong sense,
ontology cannot be only about concrete things.
Another part of Wyssusek’s claim which reflects Bunge’s specific ontolog-
ical choices is the idea of materialism. Although Bunge’s ontology commits to
a reductionist monism, many other theories are, in contrast, pluralist, meaning
that they conceive reality as organized in levels or strata which are not reduci-
ble to one another (Chmielecki 1998; Searle 2000). It is important then to
emphasize that reductionism is merely one among other possible ontological
choices (and for sure it is not generally accepted). Moreover, a non-reduction-
ist ontology is not necessarily a non-scientific ontology.
Finally, ontology is not a one-branch discipline. In (Strawson 1959), the
philosopher Peter Strawson draws a distinction between two kinds of ontolog-
ical investigation, namely, descriptive and revisionary metaphysics. Descrip-
tive metaphysics aims to lay bare the most general features of the conceptual
scheme that are in fact employed in human activities, which is roughly that of
common sense. The goal is to make explicit the ontological distinctions under-
lying natural language and human cognition. As a consequence, the categories
refer to cognitive artifacts more or less depending on human perception, cul-
tural imprints and social conventions (Masolo, Borgo, Gangemi, Guarino, and
Oltramari 2003), and do not have necessarily to agree on the principles advo-
cated by the natural sciences. Nonetheless, the very existence of these catego-
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ries can often be empirically uncovered by research in cognitive sciences (Keil
1979; 1992; McNamara 1986; Xu 2004; Xu and Carey 1996; Xu and Baker
2003; Xu, Carey, and Quint 2004) in a manner that is analogous to the way
philosophers of science have attempted to elicit the ontological commitments
of the natural sciences. Revisionary metaphysics, conversely, is prepared to
make departures from common sense in light of developments in science, and
considers linguistic and cognitive issues of secondary importance (if consid-
ered at all).
Whilst a descriptive ontology aims at giving a correct account of the cate-
gories underlying human common sense, a revisionary ontology is committed
to capture the intrinsic nature of the world in a way that is independent of con-
ceptualizing agents. Nonetheless, the taxonomies of objects produced by both
approaches can be shown to be to a large degree compatible with each other, if
only we are careful to take into account the different granularities at which
each operates (Smith and Brogaard 2002).
The conclusion is that although ontology might not be concerned with how
humans structure their conceptions, it can certainly be concerned with catego-
ries underlying these conceptions. After all, as discussed by Chmielecki
(1998), it is epistemology that desperately needs ontological foundations, not
the other way around. To put it in different way, although it is true that struc-
turing is about epistemology, and meaning is about semantics, the justification
of both the validity of many structuring choices and of the grammaticality of
many sentences can only be made on ontological grounds. For instance, it is a
language issue that in patterns such as “Exactly five x were in the kitchen last
night” and “The y which is the same as the z”, only the replacement of x, y and
z by a common noun will render sentences which are grammatical. However,
the reason why this is the case is, ultimately, an ontological one, namely: (i)
both reference and quantification require the thing (or things) which are
referred to or which form the domain of quantification to be determinate indi-
viduals, i.e., their conditions for individuation and identity must be determi-
nate; (ii) only sortal universals can carry conditions for individuation and
identity; (iii) common nouns are the linguistic counterparts of sortal univer-
sals.
In summary, we strongly disagree with the view defended in OFCM that
claims the impossibility of developing ontological foundations for conceptual
modeling. In fact, quite the contrary, we advocate that it is not only possible to
develop these foundations, and in a scientific way, but also that this is a neces-
sary step to be taken if conceptual modeling is to become a mature discipline
with sound principles and practices. As Bunge himself recognizes, every sci-
ence presupposes some metaphysics. However, ontology is not a one-branch
discipline and, about this point, we also disagree with WAND and WEBER that a
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revisionist ontology such as BUNGE’s would supply the best foundations for
conceptual modeling. After all, an area concerned with creating models of
reality for the purpose of understanding and communication, should commit to
a foundational theory that, albeit ontological, takes human language and cog-
nition seriously.
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